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PULLING PURSE STRINGS TO ELIMINATE PURSE
SEINERS: UNITED STATES PROTECTION OF DOLPHINS
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL TRADE SANCTIONS
INTRODUCTION
On April 11, 1991, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
district court decision ordering the Secretary of Commerce to en-
force a ban on the importation of yellowfin tuna into the United
States.' Mexico and other countries affected by the embargo com-
plained to a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
panel claiming that such an embargo violates the terms of GATT.2
The panel agreed with the complaining countries and recommended
that the United States lift the ban.3 While this decision was pending
approval from members of GATT, Mexico announced that it would
postpone calling for the approval." Although the Bush Administra-
tion wished to comply with the terms of GATT, it also had to fulfill
1. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), afJ'd, 929 F.2d 1449
(9th Cir. 1991).
2. GATT Panel Hears Arguments on U.S.-Mexico Tuna Dispute, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA)
(May 16, 1991); see Keith Bradsher, U.S. Ban on Mexico Tuna Is Overruled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
23, 1991, at DI. The countries involved besides Mexico included Venezuela and Vanuatu, as well
as countries that imported tuna from those nations for export to the United States: Costa Rica,
France, Italy, Japan, and Panama. Id. at D3; see GATT: Implications on Environmental Laws,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1991) [hereinafter GATT: Implications on Environ-
mental Laws].
The term GATT refers to both the provisions of the set of multilateral agreements and to the
institution which was created to administer those agreements.
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Restriction on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement
Panel Report]; see U.S. Embargo on Mexican Tuna Violates GATT Rules, Panel Finds, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1288 (Aug. 28, 1991).
4. Bowing to U.S. Pressure, Mexico to Have Observers on Tuna Boats, Delays GATT Action,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Sept. 26, 1991) [hereinafter Bowing to U.S. Pressure]. Mexico has
suffered economically from the United States embargo. While direct exports to the United States
comprise approximately 3% of Mexico's tuna export, the ban also applies to foreign canneries
that import some 84,000 tons of tuna from Mexico. See David Clark Scott, U.S. Tuna Ban May
Snag Trade Talks with Mexico, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 7, 1990, at 6. Also, the United
States and Mexico currently are negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement. Fur-
thermore, President Salinas of Mexico said that stricter rules concerning the fishing industry will
be promulgated and trained observers will board Mexican fishing vessels. See Bowing to U.S.
Pressure, supra.
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its congressional mandate under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act (MMPA).5 The MMPA prohibits, among other things, the im-
portation of tuna caught with technology that kills ocean mammals
in excess of U.S. standards.6
Yellowfin tuna, the subject of the embargo, swim below herds of
dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific.7 Dolphins are air-breathing
mammals and must surface to breathe. The surfacing dolphins
alert tuna fishermen to the presence below of schools of yellowfin
tuna.9 In the past, fishermen would catch the tuna by locating the
dolphins, chumming the water,' 0 and then catching the tuna with
unbaited hooks." The dolphins would use their sonar, or echoloca-
tion, to avoid the hooks while feeding on the bait. 2 In the early
1960s, however, fishermen began using purse seine nets to catch the
tuna."3 Dolphins are caught in these nets and either drown or are
crushed to death when the catch is hauled in.' 4
It is estimated that since 1960 purse seiners in the Eastern Tropi-
5. Marine Mammal Protection Act, Pub. L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. 1991)).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2). For an in-depth discussion of the various MMPA provisions deal-
ing with mammals other than dolphins, see Laura L. Lones, Note, The Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act and International Protection of Cetaceans: A Unilateral Attempt to Effectuate Transna-
tional Conservation, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 997 (1989).
7. Andrew Davis, Caught in the Tuna Nets: The Slaughter of Dolphins. NATION, Nov. 14,
1988, at 486. The Eastern Tropical Pacific consists of a six million square mile triangle of ocean
running from Southern California to central Chile. Id. It is defined as an area in the Pacific
Ocean bounded by 40 degrees north latitude, 40 degrees south latitude, 160 degrees west longi-
tude, and the coasts of North, Central, and South America. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1990). It there-
fore includes the coast of Mexico and its territorial waters.
8. Kenneth S. Norris, Dolphins in Crisis, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 1992, at 2, 11. Dolphins
have a lovable image due in part to the old "Flipper" television series and the fact that they
appear to have a "benign smile." Id. They are some of the most intelligent animals on earth, with
a memory capacity matching that of humans. Id. They can follow intricate visual and verbal
commands and can remember strings of random numbers. Id. In addition, there are reports of
dolphins saving the lives of people lost at sea by protecting them from Great White sharks. See
Tom Dunkel, The Dolphin Mystique, NEWSDAY. Aug. 12, 1990, at 6.
9. Dunkel, supra note 8, at 6.
10. Todd Steiner, The Senseless Slaughter of Marine Mammals, Bus. & Soc: REV., Spring
1987, at 18. Chumming is a fishing method whereby fishermen dump ground-up bait in the water




14. Id. One observer witnessed'a herd of about 1,000 northern spotted dolphins, mostly preg-
nant, nursing, or young, floating dead on the ocean surface after drowning in purse seine nets. See
Sean Kelly, Dolphins: Still Casualties of Tuna Catch; Protection Sought for Species in Pacific,
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1991, at A8.
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cal Pacific have killed six million dolphins. 15 While the U.S. tuna
fleet saw a thirty-six percent reduction in dolphin kills from 1988 to
1989,16 estimates place the number of dolphin deaths caused by all
fleets as high as 200,000 per year, endangering the survival of the
dolphin. 7 As a result of tuna fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific,
the northern spotted dolphin population has decreased to less than
one-third of the population of thirty years ago.18 In 1972, Congress
reacted to this dolphin decimation and enacted the Marine Mammal
Protection Act.' 9 The GATT panel, however, determined that the
MMPA conflicts with the terms of GATT. It recommended that the
United States either not enforce the MMPA or amend the statute to
render it consistent with GATT.
This Note addresses the controversy facing the U.S. government
regarding the MMPA's conflict with GATT. Section A of the Back-
ground will trace the relevant obligations and provisions of GATT,
focusing on its history and purpose in Subsection 1, eligibility for
participation in GATT in Subsection 2, and structure in Subsection
3. Subsection 4 outlines the principles of most-favored-nation treat-
ment, national treatment, and the prohibition against nontariff bar-
riers. Exceptions to these principles are discussed in Subsection 5,
while Subsection 6 discusses dispute resolution procedures under
GATT. Subsection 7 outlines the status of GATT in U.S. domestic
law.
Section B of the Background focuses on the Marine Mammal
Protection Act. The purpose, history, and policy behind the statute
are recounted in Subsections 1 and 2, and its relevant provisions are
discussed in Subsection 3.
This Note discusses Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, the case
that led to the enforcement of the embargo, in Section II. Next, the
GATT panel report is outlined in Section III. Finally, in Section IV,
this Note explores the relationship between the U.S. domestic envi-
ronmental protection law and the country's obligations under
15. Kenneth Brower, The Destruction of Dolphins, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1989, at 35, 38;
Scott, supra note 4, at 6.
16. Pamela A. MacLean, Court Asked to Order Tuna Embargo on Mexico, UPI, Feb. 14,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
17. David Schriebera, U.S., Mexico'Engage in Tuna War, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 29, 1990, at
Al. United States officials say that in 1989, domestic fishing fleets killed 12,643 dolphins com-
pared to 84,336 dolphins killed by foreign fleets. Id.
18. Kelly, supra note 14, at A8.
19. See Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
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GATT. In conclusion, this Note argues that the GATT panel was
correct in deciding that the tuna embargo was GATT-inconsistent.
It further contends that this controversy illustrates the need for in-
ternational cooperation in addressing environmental issues, either
through supplementing or amending GATT, or developing interna-
tional environmental treaties to protect threatened ecosystems.
I. BACKGROUND
Initially, an understanding of the relevant portions of GATT and
the MMPA is required.
A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
International business transactions are complex transactions in-
volving several contracts.2" Governments often require documents
beyond those required by the parties involved in the transaction.2"
The transaction becomes even more complex as a result of govern-
ment regulations controlling, among other things, import tariffs,
currency exchange, and product quality or packaging require-
ments.22 International regulation of international trade results from
efforts to minimize self-interested national regulation of interna-
tional trade that harms other nations. 3 GATT is an attempt by a
group of nations to "bring some order into the chaos of international
trade ... ."24
1. History and Purpose of GATT
Most of the world's international trade is governed by a set of
multilateral treaties centered around GATT.2 5 GATT grew out of a
20. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 5-7 (1969). These contracts
.include: (1) the underlying contract to sell; (2) the bill of lading or shipping contract; (3) the
insurance contract; and (4) the letter of credit through issuing and corresponding banks. Id.
21. Id. Regulations on international trade vary from country to country, and it is not always
easy to ascertain what individual governments require. There is a GATT obligation under Article
X to publish governmental regulations. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for sig-
nature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 STAT. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 UN.TS. 187 (effective Jan. 1, 1948)
[hereinafter GATT]; see also JACKSON, supra note 20, at 6 n.2 (stating that it is difficult to
determine with certainty all government regulations affecting international trade and listing
sources of information on such government regulations).
22. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 6.
23. Id. at 9.
24. Id. at 2.
25. See John H. Jackson, National Treatment Obligations and Non-Tariff Barriers, 10 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 207, 207 (1989). The four leading treatises dealing with GATT include: KENNETH W.
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failed attempt at the end of World War II to create the Interna-
tional Trade Organization.28 After World War II, the United States
sought to create this organization and, together with its allies, initi-
ated the International Trade Organization charter.27 Originally, the
United States and its allies did three things: 1) drafted the charter
for the International Trade Organization; 2) negotiated a multilat-
eral agreement to reciprocally reduce tariffs; and 3) drafted tariff
obligations. 28 However, the planned organization never materialized,
primarily because the U.S. Congress never approved it. Conse-
quently, only the reciprocal reduction in tariffs and the tariff obliga-
tions, jointly referred to as GATT, were implemented under the
Protocol of Provisional Application.2 9 The GATT organization has
since evolved into the principal international trade group.'" It con-
sists of several multilateral trade agreements and contains several
obligations, some of which have been further elaborated by separate
treaty instruments.31
2. Participation in GATT
The participants in this trade group are not referred to as "mem-
bers," but rather as "contracting parties. '3 2 The term "contracting
parties" refers to the individual members of GATT, whereas the
DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); ROBERT E.
HUDEC. THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND' WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975); JACKSON, supra
note 20; EDMOND McGOVERN. INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION (1986). One scholar esti-
mates that more than half of the world's governments are contracting parties to GATT, account-
ing for more than four-fifths of the world's trade. Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 340 (1988). Currently,
there are 103 contracting parties. LEAH A. HAUs, GLOBALIZING THE GATT (1992).
26. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 32 (1990).
27. Id. at 31-32; DAM, supra note 25, at 10.
28. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 32.
29. GATT was drafted in 1947, and although it was subordinate to the International Trade
Organization, the International Trade Organization draft was not completed until 1948. Id. at 32-
34. The drafters wished to allow nations to submit parts of GATT and the ITO charter to their
governments for approval but feared that. as information spread about the thousands of various
tariff reductions, world trade patterns would be disrupted. Therefore, under the Protocol of Provi-
sional Application, the parties implemented the tariff agreements without the International Trade
Organization charter. 55 UN.TS. 308 (1947); see JACKSON, supra note 26, at 32-36. At the time
of drafting, United States representatives were negotiating pursuant to legislation which allowed
them to undertake obligations on behalf of the United States without submitting GATT to Con-
gress for approval. Id.
30. For a detailed discussion of GATT as an organization, see JACKSON. supra note 20, at 35-
57.
31. See id. at 207.
32. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 45.
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term "CONTRACTING PARTIES" refers to the group of governments
acting collectively.3 3 One-hundred three nations have become con-
tracting parties to GATT.34 A country becomes a contracting party
in one of three ways: 1) original membership, 2) accession, or 3)
sponsorship.15
Initially, twenty-three governments became contracting parties
through original membership.36 The eight nations that had signed
the Protocol of Provisional Application and the fifteen signatories to
the final enactment of GATT constitute the original contracting
parties.3 7 The United States is an original member by virtue of sign-
ing the Protocol of Provisional Application.
A second way to become a contracting party is through accession
under Article XXXIII of GATT, 8 which requires acceptance of a
nation by a two-thirds vote of approval by the existing contracting
parties.3" In determining approval, the contracting parties consider a
number of factors including the candidate nation's willingness to ad-
here to tariff concessions already in force under GATT. 40 The ex-
isting contracting parties do not want the candidate nation to re-
ceive the benefit of forty years of trade negotiations without
committing to equivalent obligations.41 Mexico joined GATT via ac-
cession on July 18, 1986.42
Finally, a government can become a contracting party through
33. Id. at 48.
34. HAUS. supra note 25, at 2; see Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479, 479 n.1 (1990).
35. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 89.
36. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 45.
37. GATT, Final Act, Geneva, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947), 55 U.N.TS. 188 (1947); JACKSON,
supra note 20, at 91. The agreement lists the fifteen signatures of countries which did not sign the
Protocol of Provisional Application. 55 U.N.T.S. 312-15 (1947).
38. Article XXXIII of GATT provides that:
A government . . . or a government acting on behalf of a separate customs territory
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations . . . may
accede to this Agreement, on its own behalf or on behalf of that territory, on terms to
be agreed between such government and the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Decisions of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES under this paragraph shall be taken by a two-thirds majority.
GATT, supra note 21, art. XXXIII. For an in-depth discussion of the issues concerning the inte-
gration into GATT of the Soviet Union's successor states and an argument that the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES should encourage their entry into GATT, see HAUS, supra note 25.
39. GATT, supra note 21, art. XXXIII; see JACKSON. supra note 26, at 45.
40. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 45.
41. Id. This is referred to as "negotiating the ticket of admission." Id.
42. Accession of Mexico [Decision], GATT Doc. L/6024, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS [hereinafter BISD], Supp. No. 33, at 56 (1987). For an in-depth discussion of Mex-
ico's accession, see English, supra note 25, at 369.
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sponsorship upon obtaining independence from a member govern-
ment. 3 Article XXVI 5(c) provides that a formerly dependent cus-
toms territory may become a contracting party to GATT simply
through sponsorship by its former parent country." Paragraphs 5(a)
and 5(b) provide that a contracting party can make GATT effective
as to any customs territories that it controls."5 Over thirty nations
have become contracting parties to GATT through this provision."6
Additionally, pursuant to Article XXXV, any prior contracting
party may opt out of a GATT relation with another member."7
However, the already existing contracting party may opt out only at
the time the other nation enters GATT as a new contracting party. 8
This option allows the non-application of rights and obligations be-
tween contracting parties.4 9
3. Structure of GATT
GATT is comprised of three parts: the general articles, the An-
nexes, and the Schedules.5 0 The general articles, Articles I through
XXXVIII, together with the Annexes, A through I, make up the
general provisions that are intended to be applied by every con-
tracting party to all other contracting parties.5
The Schedules, I through LXVII, enumerate the concessions and
obligations that a specific contracting party owes to other con-
tracting parties and do not constitute general provisions. 52 Rather,
these schedules are annexed to GATT.53 This Note is concerned pri-
marily with the general provisions of GATT and not with the
43. GATT, supra note 21, art. XXVI, para. 5(c); see JACKSON, supra note 26, at 45; JACKSON,
supra note 20, at 89.
44. GATT, supra note 21, art. XXVI, para. 5(c).
45. Id. art. XXVI, para. 5(a)&(b). For general discussions of Article XXVI, see JACKSON .
supra note 26, at 45-46; JACKSON, supra note 20, at 96-100.
46. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 46.
47. GATT, supra note 21, art. XXXV; see JACKSON, supra note 26, at 46 (outlining the use of
the opt-out clause).
48. GATT, supra note 21, art. XXXV. This option was used extensively against Japan. In
addition, it was used for political reasons against South Africa. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 46.
49. GATT, supra note 21, art. XXXV; see JACKSON, supra note 26, at 46.
50. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 66-67.
51. GATT, supra note 21, art. XXXVIII; id. Annex A-I; see JACKSON. supra note 20, at 67;
McGOVERN . supra note 25, at 175-77.
52. GATT, supra note 21, Schedules I-LXVIl; see JACKSON, supra note 20, at 67.
53. McGOVERN, supra note 25, at 176. These schedules are arranged by country with each
country keeping the same schedule number even after new concessions and obligations are
adopted. Id. The United States has schedule number XX. Id.
19931 1091
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Schedules.
The general provisions, to which the contracting parties are sub-
ject, are ratified in trading or negotiating rounds. Originally, these
rounds primarily addressed tariff bindings, 54 but as the needs of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES have changed, the rounds have addressed
various other aspects of international trade.55 GATT is currently in
its eighth round, which began in September 1986.56 During this
round, the CONTRACTING PARTIES are negotiating agreements on
services, intellectual property, and foreign investment, among other
negotiations on trade barriers relating to goods.57
4. Pertinent Principles and Obligations of GATT
The goals of GATT, as enumerated in its preamble, are to: (a)
raise worldwide standards of living; (b) ensure full employment and
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand; (c) develop the full use of the world's resources; and (d)
expand the production and exchange of goods.58 These goals are to
be achieved through the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade" and by the "elimination of discriminatory treat-
ment in international commerce . . . .,5 Therefore, GATT obliga-
tions are based on principles of nondiscrimination and tariff
concessions.
To achieve its goals, GATT established rules regarding the way a
contracting party can apply its own international trade regulations.
There are three basic nondiscriminatory principles: 1) the most-fa-
vored-nation principle; 2) the national treatment principle; and 3)
the principle against nontariff barriers.
54. A contracting party's schedule consists of a list of goods and the treatment that the con-
tracting party accords to other contracting parties with respect to each good. Id. at 177. The
treatment accorded is known as a "binding." Id. When the schedule refers to a tariff treatment, as
opposed to a quota treatment, the obligation is known as a "tariff binding." Id.
55. See generally THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NE-
GOTIATIONS (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987) (summarizing the issues in-
volved in the most recent round of GATT negotiations).
56. See GATT, BISD Supp. No. 33, at 19-52 (1987) (detailing the text of the Declaration and
the decisions on the agenda).
57. See generally THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 55, at 89-225 (discussing the subjects for
negotiation in the Uruguay Round).
58. GATT, supra note 21, pmbl.
59. Id.
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a. Most-favored-nation principle
Under the general most-favored-nation treatment obligation,
there is a policy of nondiscrimination among member states. Pursu-
ant to Article I of GATT, each contracting party has an obligation
to every other contracting party to grant the most favorable treat-
ment, with respect to imports and exports of goods, that it grants to
any other country. 60 This most-favored-nation treatment clause is at
the heart of GATT.
Generally, the most-favored-nation treatment clause imposes un-
conditional obligations of equal treatment among contracting parties
(i.e., if nation A grants most-favored-nation treatment to nation B,
and subsequently grants to a third nation, nation C, a low tariff on
imports, nation A must accord that same low tariff to nation B). 1
However, there is also conditional most-favored-nation treatment.
For example, when nation A grants privileges to nation C while ow-
ing most-favored-nation treatment to nation B, A must grant the
equivalent privilege to B, but only after B has given some reciprocal
privilege to nation A. 2
In one case arising under GATT, India granted excise tax rebates
for products exported to some contracting parties but did not grant
the rebates to Pakistan. 3 The parties negotiated a settlement after
the practice was found to contravene Article I, paragraph 1L" The
dispute between India and Pakistan concerning internal taxes illus-
trates the most-favored-nation principle.6 5 India had levied a tax on
certain domestic goods but granted rebates to producers who ex-
ported those goods.6 The Indian government, however, excluded
from the program goods exported to Pakistan, resulting in exports to
Pakistan being taxed while goods exported to other countries were
60. Article I provides that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any con-
tracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of
all other contracting parties." GATT, supra note 21, art. I. The obligations imposed by GATT are
similar to the Uniform Commercial Code in that they apply to goods or products, but not services.
See JACKSON. supra note 26, at 44-45. Negotiations for GATT rules concerning services are un-
derway in the current Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Id.
61. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 136.
62. Id. at 137. For a general discussion of the most-favored nation obligations of GATT, see
JACKSON. supra note 20, at 255-59.
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not.67 Pakistan claimed that the rebate program violated the most-
favored-nation principle of Article 1.68 It was ruled that Article I
did apply to rebates of internal taxes in connection with exports, and
India was obligated to extend rebate privileges to goods exported to
Pakistan.69
b. National treatment principle
Similar to the most-favored-nation treatment found in Article I of
GATT, Article III, a ten-paragraph provision entitled "National
Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation," sets forth a policy
of nondiscrimination between imported goods and domestic goods.70
Paragraph 1 prohibits internal action that "afford[s] protection to
domestic production.' Paragraph 2 requires that internal taxes on
imports not exceed those taxes directly or indirectly applied to "like
domestic products.1 72 The equal treatment obligation set forth in
paragraph 2 is echoed in paragraph 4 with respect to laws, regula-
tions, and requirements affecting the "internal sale" of imported
goods. 73 Essentially, these provisions mandate that imported goods
receive the same treatment as goods of local origin.
Because this obligation is so closely related to government mea-
sures that have legitimate purposes unrelated to the protection of
domestic commerce or the restraint of foreign trade, it is often a
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. For further discussion of this case, see HUDEC, supra note 25, at 100-09.
70. GATT, supra note 21, art. I11.
71. Article Ill, paragraph 1, states:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts
or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production.
GATT, supra note 21, art. 111, para. 1.
72. Article II, paragraph 2 provides that the "products of the territory of any contracting
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject . . . to inter-
nal taxes . . . in excess of those applied . . . to like domestic products . Id. art. II, para. 2.
73. Article 111, paragraph 4, states that:
products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that ac-
corded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and re-
quirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, dis-
tribution or use.
Id. art. Ill, para. 4.
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source of complaint.74 However, a contracting party may adopt a
nondiscriminatory regulation requiring certain standards provided
that the regulation applies equally to domestic and imported
goods.7 5 This iseasily applied to regulations dealing with health or
pollution hazards created by the good or product itself because the
harm to be avoided or prohibited occurs inside the importing
country.7
A problem arises, however, when such a regulation applies to the
method of manufacture of the good, rather than to the good itself.
Governments often impose health, safety, or environmental regula-
tions on domestic production that raise the cost of production and
consequently the cost of the domestic product." Imports of identical
products from countries without such regulations may be priced
more cheaply, which in turn distresses the domestic producer.7 8
Arguably, the importing nation may not: 1) impose a ban; 2) im-
pose a border charge to compensate for the difference in price of the
goods; or 3) impose a tax on all the goods and offer a rebate to
domestic producers.7 9 This is because the products may be consid-
ered "like" and Article III requires that "like products" be treated
equally. The goal of this provision is to prevent domestic taxes or
regulatory policies from operating as protectionist measures.8
Whether imports were "like products" was an important issue in
a dispute between Norway and Germany concerning tariff rates on
sardines. 2 There are three types of sardines, one of which is the
pilchard, from the family Culpea pilchardus and commonly known
as a sardine.83 This fish is harvested by Portugal off the northern
coast of Africa. The two others are sprats, from the family Culpea
sprattus, and herrings, from the family Culpea harengus, and are
found in Scandinavian waters.
Norway and Germany had for many years negotiated agreements
74. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 189, 367 n.4; see HUDEC, supra note 25, at 275-96 (listing
some of the disputes based on Article 111).
75. JACKSON. supra note 26, at 208.




80. GATT, supra note 21, art. III, paras. 2, 4. For further discussion of the concept of "like
products," see JACKSON. supra note 26, at 208-10; JACKSON. supra note 20, at 259-64.
81. JACKSON. supra note 26, at 189.
82. BISD Supp. No. 1, at 53 (1953).
83. Id.
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concerning the fish, but after World War II, Germany established
separate tariff classifications for each of the three fish.84 Norway
wanted assurances that its sprats and herrings would receive equally
favorable duty rates as the Portuguese sardines and brought its
complaint before a GATT panel.85 The GATT panel "was satisfied
that it would be sufficient to consider whether in the conduct of the
negotiations ... [Norway and Germany] agreed expressly or tac-
itly to treat [the fish] as if they were 'like products' for the purposes
of the General Agreement." '86 The panel concluded that Norway
was entitled to assurances of equal treatment of its spats and
herrings.87
In a dispute between France and Brazil, a GATT panel found
that Brazil complied with GATT even though that country imposed
discriminatory internal taxes on imported and domestic cognac.88
Brazil's tax scheme provided that the tax for foreign brandy was
double the tax on domestic brandy, whatever the domestic tax rate
might be.89 Brazil explained that the discrimination was justified be-
cause the foreign and domestic cognacs contained quite different in-
gredients and were, therefore, not like products.9" The GATT panel
accepted this justification and permitted the disparate tax rates.91
c. Principle against nontariff barriers
Although GATT deals primarily with tariffs, it has strong provi-
sions for dealing with nontariff barriers.92 Nontariff barriers include
quantitative restrictions, such as quotas or embargoes. These quanti-
tative restrictions have been the most debated nontariff barriers to
international trade93 and are subject to regulation by Article XI of
GATT.94
84. Id. at 55.
85. Id. at 53.
86. Id. at 57.
87. Id.
88. 2 BISD 181 (1952).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 183.
92. DAM, supra note 25, at 19-21.
93. JACKSON. supra note 20, at 305.
94. Article XI, paragraph 1, provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product
of the territory of any contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any
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Generally, with certain enumerated exceptions, Article XI of
GATT prohibits the use of quotas or quantitative restrictions on
both imports and exports. Through these prohibitions, the architects
of GATT sought to eliminate nontariff barriers and to negotiate re-
duced tariff levels. 5 Therefore, contracting parties are prohibited
from establishing new quantitative restrictions and are required to
eliminate existing measures. 6
With respect to import restrictions, however, paragraph 2(c) pro-
vides specific exceptions for restrictions on agricultural or fishery
products under certain circumstances." Most importantly, these ex-
ceptions allow governments to alleviate food shortages and remove
surpluses, but they do not provide for restrictions based on produc-
tion methods.
5. Exceptions to GATT Principles and Obligations
While there are specific exceptions to specific obligations under
GATT,9 Article XX provides several general exceptions. These
general exceptions fall within the "police powers" or "health and
welfare powers" of a government.99 Thus, Article XX recognizes the
important rights of a sovereign nation to exercise its police power
and to protect the health and welfare of its citizens, even where such
action conflicts with international trade obligations. '
Section (b) of Article XX allows measures "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health . ... ,o Additionally, sec-
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 21, art. XI, para. 1.
95. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 115.
96. DAM, supra note 25, at 19.
97. Article Xi, paragraph 2(c) allows import restrictions on "any agricultural or fisheries
product, imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which
operate: (i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product...; or (ii) to remove a tempo-
rary surplus of the like domestic product. ... GATT, supra note 21, art. XI, para. 2(c).
98. Article XIi allows exceptions for balance-of-payment reasons. GATT, supra note 21, art.
XII. Article XIII requires that the most-favored-nation treatment be applied to any exceptions
that are invoked, Id. However, Article XIV provides an exception to this nondiscrimination re-
quirement for certain balance-of-payments applications. Id. art. XIV. Additionally, governments
may take defensive measures by imposing antidumping or countervailing duties pursuant to Arti-
cle VI. Id. art. VI.
99. JACKSON. supra note 26, at 206.
100. Id.
101. GATT, supra note 21, art. XX. This Article, entitled "General Exceptions," includes gov-
ernmental action undertaken to promote or protect:
(a) public morals
(b) protection of human, animal or plant life or health
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tion (g) of Article XX permits actions "relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consump-
tion . "... 102
However, because these exceptions could be used to justify prac-
tices that have as their actual goal protection against foreign compe-
tition, Article XX includes clauses to guard against abuse. These
exceptions are subject to a requirement similar to the most-favored-
nation treatment requirement of nondiscrimination.0 3 Article XX
allows exceptions to all GATT obligations provided that "measures
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade . ... "4
The most-favored-nation treatment requirement, added to prevent
abuse of the exceptions, renders their application difficult. It appears
that if imported goods and domestic goods are treated equally with
respect to Article XX, then no breach of the terms of GATT has
occurred. 15 Additionally, Article XX states that "nothing in this
Agreement shall . . . prevent the adoption or enforcement" of the
enumerated measures.' 0 6 Therefore, obligations under GATT are
subject to these exceptions.
The United States previously used Article XX (g) in a dispute
(c) gold or silver trade
(d) customs enforcement, monopoly laws, patents, trademarks, and copyrights
(e) banning products of prison labor
(f) protecting national treasures
(g) conserving national resources
(h) carrying out an approved commodity agreement
(i) export restrictions to implement a price-stabilization program.
GATT, supra note 21, art. XX; see JACKSON, supra note 26, at 206.
102. GATT, supra note 21, art. XX(g); see JACKSON, supra note 26, at 206.
103. Article XX, entitled "General Exceptions," allows that:
[subject to the] requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any contracting party of measures . . . (b) necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health . . . (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natu-
ral resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption . ...
GATT, supra note 21, art. XX.
104. Id.
105. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 743.
106. GATT, supra note 21, art. XX.
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concerning an embargo against Canada of all tuna and tuna prod-
ucts caught off the west coast of Canada.1"' Canada complained
that the embargo was a violation of U.S. obligations under Article
XI, which prohibits the use of quotas or any measure other than
tariffs to restrict imports or exports." 8 The United States claimed
the embargo was a measure to ensure proper conservation of certain
fish stocks and was, therefore, exempt under Article XX (g).10 9 The
GATT panel agreed with Canada, noting that the United States
had no complementary domestic regulations as required by the ex-
ception.' 10 The panel focused on the fact that the United States im-
posed no similar domestic conservation provision and concluded that
the United States should lift the embargo."' Indeed, the history of
the case suggested that the United States imposed the embargo in
response to a boundary dispute with Canada." 2 Aside from the pre-
sent dispute with Mexico, where the United States has applied
MMPA provisions both domestically and against imported goods,
the United States has never invoked Article XX (g) to defend an
environmental measure that was applied equally to foreign and do-
mestic goods.
6. Dispute Resolution in GATT
There are a variety of articles in GATT which provide techniques
for resolving differences among trading partners." 3 One is a process
whereby the CONTRACTING PARTIES as a group agree on new rules
through tariff negotiation or trade liberalization." 4 There are other
mechanisms, under Article XIX, that allow for retaliatory or recip-
rocal action between individual contracting parties.
A number of disputes, however, call for the interpretation of vari-
107. Prohibitions of Imports of Tuna Fish and Tuna Products from Canada, GATT, BISD
Supp. No. 29, at 91 (1983) [hereinafter Tuna Products from Canada].
108. Id.; see GATT, supra note 21, art. XI.
109. Tuna Products from Canada, supra note 107, at 97-99; see GATT, supra note 21, art.
XX(g).
110. Tuna Products from Canada, supra note 107, at 109; see JACKSON, supra note 26, at 207
(discussing the dispute and the GATT panel ruling).
11. Tuna Products from Canada, supra note 107, at 109.
112. Id. at 105; JACKSON. supra note 26, at 207.
113. For in-depth discussions of GATT dispute settlements and their problems, see DAM, supra
note 25, at 351-75; HUDEC. supra note 25; JACKSON, supra note 20, at 163-89; JACKSON, supra
note 26, at 84-113; John H. Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A
Proposal in the Context of GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1 (1979).
114. Jackson, supra note 113, at 4.
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ous provisions contained in GATT. These disputes are handled ei-
ther under Article XXII, which calls for consultation between the
disputing parties, 115 or under Article XXIII, which provides a proce-
dure that could culminate in a vote by the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES. "'16 Article XXII, entitled "Consultation," establishes the right
of any contracting party to consult with another contracting party
about matters related to GATT.1 7 The Article requires that each
contracting party accord to other contracting parties consideration
and an adequate opportunity to discuss concerns affecting GATT." 8
However, if a contracting party seeks more than mere denunciation
of a fault, as provided by the Consultation provision, Article XXIII
goes a step further, emphasizing remedial measures for the injury.
Article XXIII provides for a panel of contracting parties who are
not citizens of the disputing parties and who are acting in individual
capacities rather than as representatives of particular GATT mem-
bers to hear the dispute and make recommendations. 9 Third par-
ties have been allowed to present their views to the panel, a process
similar to filing an amicus curiae brief in court. 2 ' If the disputing
parties are still unable to reach an agreement, the GATT panel
writes a report for the CONTRACTING PARTIES as a group. 2' The
CONTRACTING PARTIES then vote on the panel's recommendation. A
consensus is required, and each disputing party is entitled to vote. A
disputing party can block the adoption of a panel recommendation.
However, a party rarely blocks a recommendation because it would
then likely be subject to GATT-authorized retaliation, such as in-
creased tariffs.' 22
If the panel agrees with the complaining party, and its recommen-
dations are adopted by the vote of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the
panel will likely order the injuring party to cease its activity. 2 ' If
the injuring party does not cease its activity, the complaining party
115. GATT, supra note 21, art. XXII.
116. Id. art. XXIII.
117. Id. art. XXII.
118. Id.
119. Id. art. XXIII. Professor Jackson addresses Article XXIII in particular in JACKSON, supra
note 20, at 178-87.
120. In the dispute settlement between Mexico and the United States, the panel accepted sub-
missions from II contracting parties. Dispute Settlement Panel Report, supra note 3, at 1610-16.
121. GATT, supra note 21, art. XXIII.
122. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 176.
123. Id.
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may be authorized to retaliate by suspending GATT concessions. 124
It has been suggested that GATT should require financial compen-
sation for violations.' 25 To date, however, recommendations and au-
thorization for retaliation remain the sole remedies for injury result-
ing from a violation of GATT obligations.
There is considerable international pressure to adopt panel reports
and to adhere to the recommendations. Therefore, the record of
compliance with panel recommendations is respectable. 26 John Bol-
ton, General Counsel for the Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, noted that if Mexico were to pursue adoption of the panel re-
port, and the United States were to resist adoption, the international
community would view the United States as an "international
scofflaw.
12 7
7. GATT Status in United States Law
According to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, there are four ways in which an interna-
tional agreement becomes law in the United States: 1) as a treaty,
with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate; 2) as an
executive agreement, when the matter falls within the constitutional
authority of Congress and Congress authorizes the agreement; 3) as
an executive agreement pursuant to a treaty; or 4) as an executive
agreement, based on the president's constitutional authority.1 28
While there is some disagreement among commentators as to how
GATT became recognized as law in the United States,1 29 all agree
that Congress has recognized GATT by authorizing payment of the
U.S. share of GATT expenses, by directing the president to conform
to GATT restrictions, and by considering congressional actions in
124. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 110.
125. See DAM, supra note 25, at 368.
126. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 101.
127. GATT: Implications on Environmental Laws, supra note 2, at 44.
128. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 303 (1987).
129. On the one hand, Professor Jackson argues that GATT, at the time it was implemented,
was a "valid executive agreement, entered into by the United States pursuant to authority of
congressional legislation." John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 250, 312 (1967). On the other hand, Professor
Ronald Brand argues that GATT was a congressional-executive agreement that had no authoriza-




light of GATT obligations.13
One leading GATT scholar, Professor John Jackson, argues that
the president had statutory authority to enter into GATT.'3' While
the Constitution grants Congress authority over foreign com-
merce, 32 Congress may delegate that authority to the executive
branch for limited periods of time. Professor Jackson argues that by
enacting the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, as amended and ex-
tended for three years in 1945,133 Congress authorized the president
to enter into GATT, subject to "existing legislation" under the Pro-
tocol of Provisional Application. 34 Jackson argues that the wording,
legislative history, and known precedents of prior trade agreements
at the time of the Act combine to show a delegation of authority to
the executive to enter into GATT."3 5 Jackson concludes that the
president, pursuant to congressional authorization, gave GATT do-
mestic legal effect in the United States by proclamation.'
Accordingly, as a valid executive agreement, GATT is law in the
United States. However, its application is not unlimited. Where
GATT rules conflict with legislation enacted by Congress after the
United States entered into GATT, a later-in-time rule applies, and
the subsequent legislation will prevail.3 7 Thus, domestically, any
legislation enacted by Congress subsequent to a GATT obligation
will prevail over the GATT obligation where there is a conflict be-
tween the two. Therefore, the United States can find itself in a posi-
tion where its international obligation directly conflicts with a do-
mestic obligation and it cannot legally fulfill both.
This Note focuses on the interplay between GATT and U.S. legis-
lation, in particular the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Therefore,
a closer look at the provisions and history of the MMPA is needed.
B. The Marine Mammal Protection Act
1. General Purposes of the Act
In 1972, Congress passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
130. Jackson, supra note 129, at 268; Brand, supra note 34, at 485.
131. Jackson, supra note 129, at 273-74.
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
133. See 59 STAT. 410 (1945).
134. See Jackson, supra note 129, at 273-74.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 292.
137. See Brand, supra note 34, at 508.
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which regulates the direct taking and importation of ocean mam-
mals as well as the taking of ocean mammals incidental to commer-
cial fishing." 8 The goal of this federal statute is to lower the mortal-
ity of ocean mammals.' 39 Congress granted the Secretary of
Commerce broad powers to promulgate and enforce the MMPA.'4 0
The importation provisions are enforced by the U.S. Customs Ser-
vice under the Department of the Treasury. 4'
To protect ocean mammals, Congress aimed the MMPA at com-
mercial tuna fishing, in addition to the direct taking and importing
of marine mammals. Schools of yellowfin tuna swim below herds of
dolphins. This phenomenon takes place only in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific Ocean. All dolphins are air-breathing mammals and must
surface to breath.'42 When they surface, they are visible to fisher-
men who use the dolphins to track the tuna. 4 ' The fishermen "set
on" the dolphins, chasing them and using explosives to expedite the
catching of tuna. 44 The fishing fleets use purse seine nets to haul in
the tuna catch. These nets do not discriminate between tuna and
other sea creatures; rather, marine birds, marine mammals, and
other ocean life are often caught in the nets in addition to the
sought-after tuna.'45
As a result of this method of "setting on" the dolphins and using
the purse seine nets, many of the dolphins are maimed, drowned, or
otherwise killed. Earth Island Institute, a not-for-profit environmen-
tal protection group, has documented that for every ten to twelve
tuna caught, as many as two-hundred dolphins are killed.'46 The
138. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
139. Id. § 1361. Congress found that certain species were "in danger of extinction or depletion
as a result of man's activities. ... Id. § 1361(1); it stated that these mammals, their mating
grounds, rookeries, "and areas of similar significance" should be protected to increase their stocks.
Id. § 1361(2). Furthermore, Congress wanted to encourage international cooperation in rectifying
the threat that man posed to marine mammals. Id. § 1361(4).
140. Id. §§ 1373, 1375.
141. See 50 C.F.R. § 216 (1991) (setting forth implementing regulations); 50 C.F.R. § 216.24
(1991) (setting forth regulations on fishing).
142. See supra notes 7-18 and accompanying text; see also Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher,
746 F. Supp. 964, 966-67 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (detailing the methods and effects of purse seining),
affd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
143. See supra notes 7-18 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 7-18 and accompanying text.
145. 134 CONG. REC, S16,336, S16,344-45 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statements of Sen.
Breaux and Sen. Kerry).
146. Reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 1988: Hearings on S261 Before
the Subcomm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1988) (statement of Sam LaBudde, Earth Island
Institute). Sam LaBudde testified at the Senate hearings on the reauthorization of the MMPA
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dolphin population in the Eastern Tropical Pacific has dropped sub-
stantially, and the population of one subspecies has fallen below the
level needed to sustain its population.4 7
2. Legislative History and Policy of the MMPA
Prior to the enactment of the MMPA, Congress was concerned
about the effect of the foreign fishing fleets on the dolphin popula-
tion;. This concern was evident in discussions that centered on the
protection of the dolphin rather than on the potentially harmful ef-
fect of the legislation on the domestic fishing fleets.1 4 Senator John
Kerry, in his opening statements at the Senate hearings for the
reauthorization of the MMPA, stated that he found it "particularly
troubling . . . that we see the killing of porpoises and an unwilling-
ness by foreign fleets" to implement measures to protect the dolphin
similar to those implemented by the United States."4 9 He stated that
"countries not interested in participating in conserving marine
mammals should not have access to the tuna market of the United
States."' 60 Furthermore, he explicitly added that "the goal of the
[MMPA] . . . [is] to maintain the health and stability of the
that as an observer aboard foreign tuna fishing vessels he witnessed such kills. Id. For a chilling
account of LaBudde's experience aboard a Panamanian purse seiner, see Brower, supra note 15,
at 35.
147. Reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 1988: Hearings on S261 Before
the Subcomm., supra note 146, at 101. One reason for the sharp decline is the way dolphins
reproduce. On the one hand, a female dolphin can live 35 years and give birth to a dozen off-
spring. Norris, supra note 8, at 8-10. On the other hand, a skipjack tuna will live approximately
ten years but produces two million eggs in a ninety-day spawning season. Id. at 11. This allows
the tuna to be more resilient to heavy harvesting. Id.
148. During Senate discussions on the 1988 amendment to the MMPA, Senator Kerry stated
that it was:
estimated that over 100,000 porpoise are killed each year in the ETP by both the
foreign and the domestic tuna fleet with the overwhelming majority being killed by
the foreign fleet. Last year ... 60 percent of the tuna caught and 80 percent of
porpoise killed in the ETP were taken by foreign fishermen. Clearly, the focus of the
problem lies with the foreign fleet . . . . Congress made . . . changes designed to
make the foreign fleet more accountable and responsible . . . . These changes will
force the foreign fleet to lower the number of dolphins they are killing . . . . [Tihe
legislation will require foreign fleets to cut in half their mortality rate of dolphin
134 CONG. REC. S12,946 (daily ed, Sept. 20, 1988) (emphasis added). Additionally, Representa-
tive Jones, in supporting the 1988 amendments, said, "It is important to remember that it is the
greatly increased mortality caused by foreign tuna boats which is responsible for most of the
porpoise deaths." 134 CONG. REC. H8237, 8243 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1988).
149. Reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 1988: Hearings on S261 Before
the Subcomm., supra note 146, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Kerry).
150. Id. at 3.
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marine ecosystem."'' 1  Moreover, there is no evidence that
lawmakers were concerned about international obligations when
they enacted the MMPA, and no mention is made of potential con-
flicts with any international agreements or treaties. 52 Neither
GATT, nor any other international agreement or treaty, was men-
tioned in the legislative history of the MMPA.
3. Provisions of the MMPA
In order to regulate and decrease the number of dolphins killed,
the MMPA requires the American Tunaboat Association to obtain
a permit for tuna fishing. This permit allows the American
Tunaboat Association to "set on" dolphins. 8 3 However, the fishing
fleet is limited as to the number of dolphins it may kill. 5" In 1980,
an absolute ceiling, or "taking rate," of 20,500 dolphins was set for
the entire U.S. fishing fleet. To enforce this ceiling, the MMPA
mandates that an observer be on board each tuna vessel. In 1989,
pursuant to a court order enforcing the MMPA, all American tuna
vessels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific were required to have a certi-
fied observer aboard. 55
United States fishermen who violate the MMPA face civil penal-
ties of not more than $10,000.156 Additionally, these fishermen face
criminal fines up to $20,000, imprisonment up to one year, or
151. Id. at 7.
152. Senator Breaux did ask James E. Douglas, Jr., Acting Assistant Administrator for Fisher-
ies, if there was any pressure from the State Department to "go easy" on Mexico, Panama, or
Venezuela. Id. at 80-81. The Senator expressed impatience and "embarrassment" that the em-
bargo regulations mandated by the 1984 MMPA had not been implemented. Id. Douglas re-
sponded that there had been no such pressure. Id. There was no further discussion about any State
Department involvement or any possible agreement violation.
153. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. § 1375(a)(1). This section provides:
Any person who violatesany provision of this subchapter or of any permit or regula-
tion issued thereunder may be assessed a civil penalty . . . of not more than $10,000
for each such violation. No penalty shall be assessed unless such person is given notice
and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such violation. Each unlawful taking or
importation shall be a separate offense . . ..
1993] 1105
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
both. 15 7 Furthermore, they risk seizure of their cargo if they violate
the provisions of the MMPA. 156
The MMPA also mandates the embargo of yellowfin tuna caught
in the Eastern Tropical Pacific by nations that fail to meet several
requirements set forth in the MMPA.' 59 The government of any for-
eign country exporting tuna or tuna products to the United States
must provide to the Secretary of Commerce several pieces of docu-
mentary evidence.'6 0 The MMPA requires proof that the harvesting
nation has adopted a program, comparable to that in the United
States, that regulates the incidental taking of marine mammals. 6 '
Additionally, to overcome the ban, the foreign nation bears the
burden of documenting to the Secretary of Commerce that the inci-
dental taking rate of its tuna vessels is comparable to that of Ameri-
can vessels harvesting Eastern Tropical Pacific tuna.' Initially,
Congress defined "comparable" as a rate of no more than two times
the U.S. rate. However, the definition evolved and by the end of the
1990 fishing season, "comparable" was defined as no more than 1.25
times the U.S. rate."' Each harvesting nation is also limited with
respect to the types of dolphins taken. Eastern spinner dolphins tak-
ings may not exceed fifteen percent of the total incidental taking,
and the coastal spotted dolphin taking rate is limited to two
percent. 64
Once the embargo has been in place for six months, the Secretary
of Commerce must certify the embargo to the president,'65 which
triggers the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 (the Pelly Amend-
157. Id. § 1375(b). This section provides criminal penalties such that "[any person who know-
ingly.violates any provision of this subchapter or of any permit or regulation issued thereunder
shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $20,000 for each such violation, or imprisoned for
not more than one year, or both." Id.
158. Id. § 1377(d)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1991). This provision allows the seizure of "the cargo of
any vessel ...subject to the jurisdiction of the United States used or employed contrary to the
provisions of this subchapter or the regulations issued hereunder ... " Id.
159. Id. § 1371(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1991). The MMPA was amended in October 1992 by
the International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1411-1418 (West Supp.
1992). The law puts a five-year global moratorium on the practice of purse seine fishing for yel-
lowfin tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1415. For a discussion of this amend-
ment and its provisions, see infra notes 266-92 and accompanying text.
160. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B).
161. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(i).
162. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii).
163. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(ll).
164. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(111).
165. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(D).
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ment). 66 This certification can lead to the embargo of all of the
harvesting nation's fish products, not just the specific products
targeted by the original embargo.16 7 At the time of the GATT hear-
ing, Mexico had not been certified and was not subject to the provi-
sions of the Pelly Amendments.
Moreover, section 1371 of the MMPA requires proof from foreign
governments that harvesting of tuna for export to the United States
was not conducted with large-scale driftnets, no matter what the
incidental taking rate is."6 8 Congress further extended the require-
ments to "any intermediary nation from which yellowfin tuna or
tuna products will be exported to the United States . ," 169 In-
termediary nations are those which import tuna for processing and
canning and then export the processed tuna to the United States.
These exporting nations are required to document that they have
acted to prohibit the import into their own countries of tuna from
any country whose tuna is banned pursuant to the MMPA in the
United States. 170 Moreover, there are no exceptions to the MMPA
provisions. These provisions were recently litigated in the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher.171
II. EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. MOSBACHER
On April 11, 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the grant of an injunction by the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California barring the importation of
yellowfin tuna from Mexico. 172 Earth Island Institute, a nonprofit
organization whose members share a commitment to the protection
of marine mammals, sought to enforce various provisions of the
MMPA, especially those that apply to the foreign tuna fishing
fleet.173 In 1984, the MMPA provided that tuna harvested with
purse seine nets could be imported only upon proof by the exporting
nation's government that it: 1) has in place a "comparable" regula-
166. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
167. Id. § 1978(a)(4). The secondary embargo is discretionary, not mandatory. Id.
168. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(E)(ii).
169. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(C).
170. Id. Costa Rica, France, Italy, Japan, and Panama were embargoed. Taking and Importing
of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,995 (notify-
ing importers of the embargo).
171. 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
172. Id. The government has not applied to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.
173. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 966 (N.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 929 F.2d
1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
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tory program to that of the United States and 2) has an average
incidental taking rate comparable to that of the U.S. fleet. 7 , Con-
gress gave the Secretary of Commerce broad discretion to promul-
gate and enforce regulations. 175
Four years later, in 1988, only interim final regulations had been
enacted, giving foreign nations until 1991 to comply with the terms
of the MMPA. 176 Congress reacted by taking away agency discre-
tion. It required foreign fleets to comply with specific comparability
standards by the end of 1989. The court in Earth Island noted that
at the time of the decision, "the 1989 fishing season ha[d] come and
gone" and that "nearly nine months into the 1990 fishing season, no
"9177comparability findings [had] been made ....
The defendant, the Secretary of Commerce, argued that the
* MMPA mandated comparability findings "by the end of the 1989
fishing season" 17 and that this meant it was required to base its
findings on the entire 1989 fishing season.' 79 The agency argued
that many vessels left port in December and did not return for sev-
eral months and that only upon their return could data be col-
lected.18 ° The district court disagreed, stating that the comparison
"[could] be made based upon data from the first six months of
1990, or even for the year of 1989, so long as that data demon-
strated that the average taking rates . . . [did] not exceed 1.25
times that of the United States vessels for the same period.''
The district court granted a preliminary injunction against the
importation of yellowfin tuna from Mexico.'82 The court held that
the Secretary's inaction was in clear contravention of the statute
and, therefore, the agency decision was not entitled to deference.' 83
It stated that the Secretary was required to make positive and com-
plete findings by the end of 1989 regarding exporting nations' inci-
dental taking rates. 84 The Secretary was consequently enjoined
174. 16 U.S.C § 1371(a)(2)(B); see Earth Island, 746 F. Supp. at 968.
175. 16 U.S.C §§ 1373, 1374; see Earth Island, 746 F. Supp. at 967.
176. Reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 1988: Hearings on S261 Before
the Subcomm., supra note 146, at 4 (opening statement of Sen. Breaux).
177. Earth Island, 746 F. Supp. at 968.




182. Id. at 976.
183. Id. at 964.
184. Id. at 965.
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from allowing the importation of yellowfin tuna or tuna products
caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific with purse seine nets by for-
eign nations. 185
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision.' 86 Because the Secretary had made no positive find-
ings with respect to tuna harvested by Mexico, the provisions of the
MMPA required that the importation of yellowfin tuna from that
country cease.' 87 Furthermore, the court invalidated a National
Marine Fisheries Service regulation that allowed the Secretary to
base reconsideration of a tuna embargo on only six months of data
concerning dolphin kill comparability findings.' 88
The government argued that the six-month "reconsideration" pro-
vision was within the discretion granted by Congress for regulatory
implementation of the Act. 89 The court stated that "agencies do not
have discretion to issue regulations which conflict with statutory lan-
guage and congressional purpose . . . . This regulation clearly
does."' 90
The government also argued that its regulation should be upheld
as a matter of policy because it "offers an incentive to foreign coun-
tries to speed up their efforts to meet the statutory standards."''
Again, the court rejected the government's argument, stating that
the "record in this case belies the existence of any incentive ef-
fect."' 92 The court criticized the agency's "lax record of promulgat-
ing and enforcing standards for foreign fleets" and held that there
was "no basis in the history of the enforcement of the Act for [the
court] to conclude that the agency's policies [were] aimed at more
stringent enforcement of Congressional policy."' 93 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the district court's injunction. 94
As a result of the court order, the United States barred the im-
portation of yellowfin tuna from Mexico, Venezuela, and the Pacific
island nation of Vanuatu. 95 Additionally, tuna and tuna product
185. Id. at 976.
186. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991).
187. Id. at 1452-53.
188. Id.




193. Id. at 1453.
194. Id.
195. Vanuatu was formerly known as New Hebrides. The embargo on imports from Vanuatu
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imports from France, Costa Rica, Italy, Japan, and Panama were
barred because those countries purchase tuna from the embargoed
countries. 9 6
The Ninth Circuit allowed the MMPA to govern without examin-
ing the impact of the ruling on GATT obligations, even though the
two directly conflict. Whereas the MMPA mandates a quantitative
restriction, GATT prohibits such restrictions. In light of this con-
flict, an analysis of the legality of the MMPA under GATT and the
relationship of the two sets of obligations under U.S. domestic law is
required.
III. THE GATT PANEL REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES TUNA
EMBARGO
The GATT panel findings remain confidential until the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES adopt them. 197 They remain confidential to en-
courage further negotiations and settlement between the disputing
parties.' The GATT panel report addressing the tuna embargo
was released at the request of the disputing parties.' 9
The panel found the primary embargo under the MMPA to be an
impermissible prohibition.200 Mexico argued that the applicable pro-
vision was Article XI of GATT, which prohibits quantitative restric-
tions and embargoes, 20' and that both the MMPA and the Pelly
Amendment violated Article XI. 0 z Mexico further urged a restric-
tive interpretation of Article 111.203 It argued that the U.S. actions
illegally discriminated between domestic and imported products
was lifted in January, 1992 after Vanuatu submitted evidence that its regulations were compara-
ble to the United States regulatory program. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration Agency, 57 Fed. Reg. 2710 (1992); see Government Asks Appeals
Court to Overturn Tuna Embargo and Stay Order Pending Appeal, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA)
(Feb. 6, 1992).
196. The United States Customs Service announced that the embargo would cover yellowfin
tuna imported from Britain, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Panama, Singapore, the Marshall Islands, the Netherlands Antilles,
Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. U.S. Enforces Tuna Embargo,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1992, at D3.
197. GATT: Implications on Environmental Laws. supra note 2, at 7 (statement of John
Bolten, General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Dispute Settlement Panel Report, supra note 3, at 1618-20.
201. Id. at 1602.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1603.
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based solely on production processes.2 04 Mexico also urged a restric-
tive interpretation of the exceptions allowed in Article XX.2 05
The Americans disputed Mexico's challenge of the Pelly Amend-
ment. They pointed out that the Pelly Amendment was discretion-
ary and that no action had been taken pursuant to it.206 They ar-
gued that, in the absence of certification or further embargo, the
GATT panel should not act with respect to it.
207
As for the MMPA, the United States argued that the pertinent
provision was Article III of GATT rather than Article XI.2 08 The
argument was based on the fact that the embargo was an internal
measure which, according to the United States, treated imported
tuna no differently from domestic tuna.2 0 9 The United States also
argued that the requirements under the MMPA were simply inter-
nal measures applied equally to domestic and foreign products and
not in a protectionist manner. 10 It claimed that the general excep-
tions in Article XX applied to the MMPA and that the MMPA was
necessary to avoid "needless deaths." '211
The GATT panel disagreed. Based on the plain meaning of the
wording, it stated that in order to apply internal measures at the
border, the measures must apply to the product itself.2 12 The panel
determined that the MMPA illegally based its measures on the pro-
duction process rather than the product.21 The panel further noted
that the embargo was a quantitative restriction, in clear violation of
Article XI. 1 4
Second, the panel explained that the exceptions for measures nec-
essary to protect animal life or health in Article XX(b) or those
relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources in Arti-
cle XX(g) are not available for measures applied
extrajurisdictionally.2 1 5
The panel conceded that GATT is ambiguous as to whether Arti-
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1605.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1602.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1603.
211. Id. at 1606.
212. Id. at 1618.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1619-20.
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cle XX(b) covers measures taken to protect life outside a con-
tracting party's jurisdiction but found that the exception could not
be applied to protect the life or health of humans, animals, or plants
outside the jurisdiction of the United States.216 Similarly, the panel
found that Article XX(g) could not be applied extra-
jurisdictionally.217
The panel's reasoning in both instances, Article XX(b) and Arti-
cle XX(g), depended partially on each country's freedom under
GATT to set its own environmental policies.2"' The panel was con-
cerned that if the exceptions were available for extrajurisdictional
measures, a country could take trade measures based on another
country's different environmental policies, thereby infringing on that
other country's right to establish its own environmental policies. The
panel considered that if the broad interpretation suggested by the
United States was accepted, each GATT contracting party could
unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies from
which other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardiz-
ing their rights under GATT.2 9 The unilateral nature of these mea-
sures would be contrary to the multilateral nature of GATT.
In its concluding remarks, however, the panel noted that adoption
of its report would not affect the right of the contracting parties,
acting jointly, to address international environmental problems
which can only be resolved through measures in conflict with the
present rules of GATT.2 0 The panel said the Pelly Amendment was
not GATT-inconsistent. 22' According to the panel, provisions that
merely authorize action inconsistent with GATT are not, in them-
selves, inconsistent with GATT.222
The panel concluded that its decision did not limit the ability of
countries to pursue their own internal environmental policies. Coun-
tries are free to tax or regulate imported products and like domestic
products as long as the taxes or regulations do not discriminate
against imported products or afford protection to domestic products.
A country is also free to tax or regulate domestic production for
216. Id. For a contrary view, see Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in
GATT Article XX, 1991 J. WORLD TRADE L. 37, 52-53.
217. Dispute Settlement Panel, supra note 3, at 1619-22.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1622.
221. Id. at 1619.
222. Id.
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environmental purposes."' The panel recommended that if it is nec-
essary to have a different rule for extrajurisdictional application of
measures, then it would be preferable to amend or supplement
GATT rather than to interpret the exceptions broadly.
IV. ANALYSIS
There is an obvious tension between the United States' domestic
law and its GATT obligations as interpreted by the GATT panel.
The United States claimed an exemption based on the general ex-
ception provided in Article XX of GATT.224 This exception allows a
country to implement measures affecting foreign countries that are
designed to conserve "exhaustible natural resources" where the
measures apply equally to domestic production or consumption. 25
The panel, however, agreed with the Mexican position that the ban
was a commercial barrier and a protectionist measure incompatible
with GATT principles.226
First, this Analysis examines the most-favored-nation principle
with respect to the MMPA. Second, it discusses the relationship be-
tween the national treatment principle and the MMPA. A discus-
sion of the MMPA and the principle against nontariff barriers fol-
lows. Next, the legality of the MMPA under GATT and the
possible application of the Article XX exception to the statute are
evaluated. Finally, GATT's status in U.S. domestic law is
summarized.
A. The MMPA and the Most-Favored-Nation Principle
The MMPA does not conflict with GATT's most-favored-nation
treatment provisions. Article I of GATT requires that each con-
tracting party treat each other contracting party equally with re-
spect to imports and exports.22 7 A contracting party may not extend
a privilege to a country without permitting all contracting parties to
benefit from that privilege.
223. Id. at 1622.
224. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text (summarizing the United States' argu-
ment for allowing the MMPA provisions to operate).
225. GATT, supra note 21, art. XX (g); see supra notes 98-112 (outlining Article XX's gen-
eral exceptions to GATT obligations).
226. See supra notes 197-223 and accompanying text (discussing the GATT panel decision).
227. GATT, supra note 21, art. I; see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing
GATT's most-favored-nation principle).
1993] 1113
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
The MMPA does not single out specific countries to which its
requirements apply. Rather, the statute requires that "the govern-
ment of the exporting nation" provide evidence that its fishing ves-
sels comply with the enumerated taking rates. 2 The statute does
not make exceptions for any particular country or countries; it im-
poses on all countries the same restrictions and accords to all coun-
tries the same privileges upon compliance, whether they are con-
tracting parties to the Agreement or not. As applied, the MMPA
does not discriminate in contravention of GATT. The MMPA man-
dates that similar measures be taken for similar reasons against im-
ports of tuna and tuna products from countries other than Mexico
(e.g., Vanuatu and Venezuela). The embargo does not apply in a
manner that arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminates between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail. However, the MMPA does
create problems vis-A-vis the second GATT nondiscrimination prin-
ciple - the national treatment principle.
B. The MMPA and the National Treatment Principle
At first glance, the MMPA appears not to discriminate between
foreign and domestic tuna. The GATT national treatment principle,
set forth in Article III, aims to prevent protectionist measures. 229 To
this end, the provision requires that contracting parties treat like
domestic and imported products the same. Both foreign and domes-
tic tuna fishermen are subject to comparable restrictions. Under the
MMPA, however, some imported tuna is discriminated against in a
way that may be considered illegal under GATT.
There is no question that the domestic and imported products at
issue are like products. 2 30 In both cases the product is yellowfin tuna
caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean. Similarly, even when
the tuna is processed by an intermediary country, there appears to
be equal treatment of like products. A member of the U.S. fishing
fleet may not circumvent the MMPA by selling its tuna to a foreign
country for processing. The dolphin mortality ceiling is imposed on
the entire catch of the domestic fishing fleet, and it is not restricted
to that part which is brought directly back into the United States.
228. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B).
229. See supra notes 70-91 and accompanying text (discussing GATT's national treatment
principle).
230. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text (discussing "like products" with respect to
GATT).
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Therefore, regardless of where the domestic fishermen sell their
catch, they are subject to permit restrictions.31
Thus, in one respect, the MMPA appears to treat imported tuna
more favorably than domestic tuna. Foreign fleets are subject to
more relaxed standards concerning dolphin mortality. A harvesting
nation is permitted to kill dolphins at a rate twenty-five percent
higher than that of the United States.232 Furthermore, the foreign
fishermen are dependent on the U.S. mortality rate. They are sub-
ject to a rate that is not constant, whereas, the rate for domestic
fishermen is constant. Additionally, the domestic fleet is small, so
depending on the number of vessels a country has, there is a dispar-
ity not only between the United States and the foreign allowance,
but also among the foreign fleets.
However, discrimination based on the manufacturing process or
some characteristic of the exporting country violates GATT obliga-
tions to treat like products equally.233 The focus of the obligation is
on the good itself, regardless of what manufacturing process takes
place. 34 Under this interpretation, the embargo provisions of the
MMPA do indeed violate GATT because they are aimed at fishing
methods unacceptable to the United States, rather than being aimed
at some characteristic of the yellowfin tuna itself. Since the prohibi-
tion's goal is not preservation of depleted yellowfin tuna, it violates
GATT.
Additionally, the MMPA may fail to meet the national treatment
standard of GATT where the MMPA sanctions are concerned. Both
domestic and foreign fleets face the prospect of a closed market in
the United States. However, the sanctions are imposed in different
manners depending on who caught the tuna: a foreign fleet faces
embargo, the domestic fleet faces seizure of cargo after a hearing.
Whereas domestic fishermen are not subject to sanctions without
due process protections,23 5 there is no opportunity for a foreign na-
tion to challenge an embargo prior to its imposition. While this dis-
231. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h); see supra notes 153-58 (enumerating penalties imposed on domestic
fishermen).
232. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(1l); see supra notes 159-64, 168-71 (listing the penalties
imposed against foreign fishing fleets).
233. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 224-25; see supra notes 212-20 (explaining the GATT panel
decision that the MMPA illegally regulated production methods rather than goods themselves and
did not fall under any exceptions).
234. See JACKSON. supra note 26, at 208-09.
235. 16 U.S.C. § 1375.
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tinction is not troublesome under U.S. domestic law, it poses a prob-
lem under GATT's national treatment principle because the
domestic producers have the benefit of prior notice and opportunity
for a hearing before the U.S. market is closed to them. This is in
contrast to the treatment of foreign producers who have no opportu-
nity to challenge U.S. action prior to confiscation of their goods.
More importantly, as the Mexican representative alleged, and as the
GATT panel confirmed, the United States violates the GATT prin-
ciple that prohibits nontariff barriers because it imposes quantitative
restrictions when it enforces the embargo provision of the MMPA.
C. The MMPA and the Principle Against Nontariff Barriers
When the United States embargoed tuna imported from nations
that were contracting parties, it clearly violated Article XI, para-
graph 1 of GATT. This provision explicitly states that tariffs are the
only restrictions that a contracting party may impose on products
imported from any other contracting party.2"' Article XI states that
"quotas, import or export licences or other measures" are prohibited
and that only "duties, taxes or other charges" are permissible
restrictions.237
The MMPA, on the other hand, burdens contracting parties by
mandating an import restriction that is neither a duty, a tax, nor
another charge. The requirement that foreign governments provide
written documentation that the dolphin mortality rates of their ves-
sels comply with U.S. environmental legislation operates as a "li-
cense" at worst and constitutes an "other measure" at best. The
exporting contracting party faces a closed U.S. market if it fails to
study the dolphin mortality rate of its commercial fishing fleets or if
it fails to implement regulations similar to those of the United
States, including the requirement of an observer on board the vessel.
Because this limitation violates GATT, the United States must jus-
tify it in some way. To that end, it claimed that the MMPA falls
under the exception in Article XX.
D. The MMPA as an Article XX Exception
The United States argued that its action was fully justified under
236. GATT, supra note 21, art. XI, para. 1; see supra notes 92-97 (discussing nontariff barri-
ers under GATT).
237. GATT, supra note 21, art. XI.
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Article XX (g) of GATT,238 which provides an exception to other
GATT obligations for measures relating to conservation of exhaus-
tible natural resources.23 9 One could argue further that the MMPA
was in no way motivated by trade considerations.
The first element in showing that the measures provided under
the MMPA were justified under Article XX(g) was that the subject
be an exhaustible natural resource. There is little question that dol-
phins are potentially subject to exhaustion or depletion. 4 Although
Mexico argued that yellowfin tuna, the subject of the embargo, is
not a depleted resource, dolphins are depleted and threatened with
extinction. The dolphins face extinction if the purse seine method of
fishing for tuna is continued; therefore, the protection of the species
is inextricably linked to the methods employed for harvesting yel-
lowfin tuna.
GATT states that the exception applies to measures "relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources."241 A GATT
panel found that a trade measure need not be "necessary or essen-
tial to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource," but the
measure must be "primarily aimed at the conservation of [such] re-
source to be considered as 'relating to' conservation within the
meaning of Article XX(g)." '242 Unlike the Canada-U.S. tuna case
where the GATT panel found that the U.S. embargo was actually a
response to the Canadian seizure of American vessels,243 there is no
ulterior motive behind the embargo in this case.244 The primary aim
of the MMPA is the conservation of marine mammals and, in this
particular instance, dolphins.24 5 Additionally, there is a close nexus
between restrictions on the harvesting of yellowfin tuna and protec-
tion against dolphin depletion, and it is arguable that this nexus
should satisfy the GATT exception for conservation of natural
resources.
The MMPA restrictions on both domestic and foreign producers
238. Dispute Settlement Panel Report, supra note 3, at 1606; see supra note 198 and accompa-
nying text.
239. See supra notes 98-112 (discussing Article XX's general exceptions to GATT obligations).
240. See supra notes 146-51 (explaining the effect of purse seine fishing on the dolphin popula-
tion in the Eastern Tropical Pacific).
241. GATT, supra note 21, art. XX(g).
242. Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT,
BISD 35 Supp. 98, 114 (1989) (stating that Article XX exceptions must be narrowly construed).
243. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 139-55 and accompanying text.
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arguably "relate to" the conservation of dolphins. The method of
fishing for yellowfin tuna is necessarily linked to the mortality of
dolphins due to the symbiotic relationship the fish have with the
mammals.246 Purse seine fishing for tuna kills dolphins and poses a
grave threat to the dolphins' survival in the Eastern Tropical Pacific.
Eliminating this method of fishing and monitoring dolphin kills re-
sulting from tuna fishing are conservation measures that the United
States has deemed most appropriate. In this way, the restrictions
placed on the tuna fishing fleets "relate to" the conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources.
Furthermore, as required by Article XX (g), the United States
has made the measures effective "in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production . . . .""I The provisions of the MMPA require
that domestic fishing fleets both obtain permits for taking of dol-
phins and limit the number of incidental dolphin killings.24
Finally, the legislation fulfills the GATT requirement that the
measures not be applied "in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail ... ."I"' Under the MMPA, all
foreign harvesting nations are subject to the documentary require-
ments and the same taking rates.
Although Mexico claimed that the U.S. action was a disguised
restriction on international trade and the GATT panel agreed, the
history of the legislation and the more stringent taking rates im-
posed on the domestic fishing fleet indicate that the motivation for
the U.S. action was in no way trade related.
More importantly, the Secretary of Commerce resisted imposing
the embargo in spite of the congressional mandate. 5 ° Significantly,
it was a not-for-profit environmental protection group, Earth Island
Institute, that brought suit to enforce the international provisions of
the MMPA. There is no evidence that either the U.S. Congress, the
Secretary of Commerce, or Earth Island Institute was motivated by
international trade concerns when drafting, implementing, or seek-
ing to enforce the MMPA.
The GATT panel noted that the United States unilaterally im-
246. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
247. GATT, supra note 21, art. XX(g); see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1374.
248. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1374.
249. GATT, supra note 21, art. XX.
250. See supra notes 171-96 (summarizing Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, the case that
forced the secretary to act).
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posed its own conservation measures in an area not within U.S. ju-
risdiction.25 Although GATT does not explicitly restrict conserva-
tion measures to resources found inside the importing country, the
panel interpreted the provision this way. Indeed, one could argue
that Article XX(g) applies to resources inside the importing
country.
The panel has unequivocally, condemned the use of quantitative
import restrictions to promote and enforce domestic environmental
protection policies extraterritorially. Nonetheless, the Secretary of
Commerce will, indeed must, enforce the U.S. conservation policy
concerning dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific against foreign
nations. This is because the MMPA, as a federal statute, trumps
U.S. international obligations under GATT.
E. GATT in United States Domestic Law
As a valid executive agreement, GATT is law in the United
States.2 52 However, where Congress enacts legislation subsequent to
an executive agreement, and where the two conflict, the subsequent
legislation prevails.2 53 GATT became law by proclamation in the
1940s, 54 whereas Congress enacted the relevant provisions of the
MMPA in the 1980s. 255 Therefore, where GATT and the MMPA
conflict, the MMPA prevails.
This puts the United States in a precarious position with its inter-
national trade partners. As an original drafter of GATT and a ma-
jor proponent of open and free international trade, the U.S. execu-
tive branch would like to work within the parameters of GATT.256
This is especially true in view of the critical attitude the United
States takes toward contracting parties who disregard GATT obli-
gations and panel recommendations.
Indeed, the Bush Administration considered amending the
MMPA to eliminate the conflict.257 However, members of Congress
criticized this consideration. 5 8 Any effort by the executive to
251. Dispute Settlement Panel, supra note 3, at 1619.
252. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
257. Members Agree to Develop Proposal on GATT Changes to Protect Environment, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1428 (October 2, 1991).
258. Id.
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change the MMPA will meet with strong resistance. Members of
Congress refuse to change the MMPA and have instead called for
changing or amending GATT to allow for environmental protection
provisions."'
One possible solution is to amend GATT to include an environ-
mental code that would allow nations to promote legitimate environ-
mental objectives. Each nation could establish its own environmen-
tal standards.6 0 The importing nation could apply a duty if the
imported product, or the manufacturing process used to produce
that product, does not meet the importing country's environmental
standards. The imposition of a duty would be subject to criteria
such as: 1) the environmental regulations having a sound scientific
basis; 2) the same environmental standards applying to all competi-
tive domestic products and production; and 3) the imported products
causing injury to competitive domestic products.26' Contracting par-
ties could bring disputes concerning environmental duties before a
GATT dispute settlement panel, which is already provided for in
GATT.
Such an amendment to GATT would address the competitive ad-
vantage lost by a nation that attempts to set rigorous environmental
protection standards.-If another nation chooses not to impose ade-
quate environmental protection standards, it decreases the cost of
doing business at the environment's expense.262 As that nation con-
tinues to damage the environment, it gains a competitive advantage
which can translate into trade gains.263 The proposed amendment
would accomplish the goal of "leveling the playing field" without
contravening the GATT goal of eliminating nontariff trade barriers.
As world economies grow more interdependent, and as nations rec-
ognize that environmental issues must be addressed globally, the
scope of trade negotiations must expand to address environmental
concerns.
264
The enforcement of the MMPA and the subsequent conclusion by
259. Baucus Calls for Environmental Code in GATT Modeled After Subsidies Code, 8 int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1568 (October 30, 1991) [hereinafter Baucus Calls for Environ-
mental Code].
260. See Baucus Calls for Environmental Code in GA TT Modeled After Subsidies Code, Int'l
Env't Daily (BNA) (Oct. 28, 1991).
26 1. Id.
262. See Luncheon Address by Senator Max Baucus to the Institute for International Eco-
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a GATT panel that such enforcement constitutes a GATT-illegal
trade barrier have brought to the forefront a major international
trade issue of the 1990s.265 United States reaction to the GATT de-
cision affects both its relations with international trade partners and
environmental protection policies, both domestic and international.
V. IMPACT
The ruling by the GATT panel prohibits a contracting party from
enforcing its own choice of environmental protection laws extraterri-
torially. In enforcing the MMPA, the United States forces its trade
partners to adhere to its unilateral decision about conservation in an
area which is not under U.S. jurisdiction. The United States, in not
responding to the GATT panel ruling, sends a clear message that it
considers the protection of dolphins more important than its obliga-
tions under GATT.
At the same time, U.S. participation in GATT is essential to
GATT's international effectiveness. If the United States overrides
GATT tenets by enacting contravening legislation, it could eviscer-
ate one of the world's only organizations dedicated to free trade
among nations. The United States' unique role as a charter member
and creator of GATT, as well as its economic power, gives it a lead-
ership role in the organization.
The Earth Island decision and the subsequent denunciation by
GATT have pushed Congress a step further. The International
Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992 (Act)2"6 reflects Congress's en-
trenchment with respect to protecting dolphins from the effects of
purse seine fishing.2"7 Senator Kerry stated that the Act was "based
on the recognition that the past strategy of trying to reduce dolphin
mortality while continuing to fish for tuna in association with
dolphin is no longer sufficient. 26 8 He placed "primary responsibility
for dolphin mortality" on the "foreign flag fishing fleets of Mexico,
Venezuela, Vanuatu, and elsewhere" and concluded that "domestic
265. See Baucus Calls for Environmental Code, supra note 259.
266. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1411-1481 (West Supp. 1992).
267. Senator John Kerry stated that the amendment was "not aimed simply at 'making a state-
ment' or 'sending a message'" 138 CONG. REC. S17,840, S17,841 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992).
Rather, the senator stated, the law was "aimed at getting results" and reflected Congress's "best
efforts to synthesize the ideas and views of a variety of organizations and tuna processors about
how best to assure that positive results are indeed achieved." Id.
268. Id.
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action alone [was] not sufficient to end the killing of dolphins."26
Representative William Hughes, in a statement supporting passage
of the Act and expressing belief that the embargoes effectively re-
duced dolphin mortality, said that the Act would resolve "the
GATT problem. 270
The Act authorizes the Secretary of State to enter into an inter-
national agreement to establish a five-year moratorium, beginning
March 1, 1994, prohibiting purse seine fishing for tuna.27' Congress
required that any such international agreement provide for an inter-
national research program to develop dolphin-safe methods of tuna
fishing.2 72 If a major purse seine tuna fishing country 73 enters into
this international agreement, the permit allowing purse seine fishing
issued to the American Tunaboat Association 74 will expire March
1, 1994, effectively prohibiting any purse seining in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific by Americans.275
The most important feature of the Act exempts nations fishing in
the Eastern Tropical Pacific from the MMPA's trade sanctions only
if they agree to a five-year moratorium on purse seine fishing. To
qualify for exemption from a tuna embargo, the country must re-
duce dolphin mortality between now and March 1, 1994 and agree
to suspend purse seine fishing on dolphins completely for a period of
at least five years after that date.276
Qualifying nations must also commit to having an observer on
each purse seine vessel larger than four-hundred short tons carrying
capacity, and fifty percent of each country's observers must be su-
pervised by and responsible to "a competent regional organization
... 277 The United States will "periodically" review the actions
of countries participating in the moratorium.278 If the country is not
"fully implementing" the moratorium commitments, it is subject to
an embargo of not only its tuna, but also all of its other fish and fish
269. Id.
270. 138 CONG. REC. E2774 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1992).
271. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1412.
272. Id. § 1413.
273. A major purse seine tuna fishing country is one that "has an active purse seine tuna fish-
ing fleet of 20 or more vessels." Id.
274. For a discussion of the permit issued to American fishermen, see supra notes 153-58.
275. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1416.
276. Id. § 1415(a).
277. Id.
278. Id. § 1415(b).
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The current version of the Act, however, does not dispose of the
embargo provisions of 16 U.S.C. § 1371, which were condemned by
the GATT panel.2 80 Rather, it adds an alternative method of avoid-
ing the embargo but still requires that foreign fishing fleets adhere
to standards established unilaterally by the United States.2 8l Fur-
thermore, the Act mandates an embargo of yellowfin tuna and al-
lows exclusion of other fish products imported from any country that
does not honor its initial commitment to refrain from purse seine
fishing. 2 Because the Act does not eliminate the provisions found
to be inconsistent with GATT obligations, and because it provides
another mechanism to coerce trading partners to adhere to Ameri-
can production standards or suffer quantitative restrictions, the Act
does nothing to solve "the GATT problem." It is likely that a com-
plaint about the new provisions would receive the same recommen-
dation from GATT that the United States not enforce the
embargoes.
If Congress does not alter the force of the international provisions
of the MMPA and continues trade sanctions against countriesthat
do not adhere to the MMPA's dolphin preservation provisions, the
United States may see retaliatory measures authorized and imple-
mented. GATT may authorize affected countries to impose duties
on products imported from the United States. Mexico and the other
affected countries have not yet sought this recourse. On the con-
trary, Mexico and the European Community have sought to
strengthen their own regulations concerning dolphin mortality re-
sulfing from purse seine fishing for tuna. 83 As a result of the en-
forcement of the MMPA, countries are reexamining and restricting
the fishing methods that their tuna fishermen use. This could even-
279. Id.
280. See supra notes 197-223 (outlining the GATT panel's report on the tuna embargo).
281. See 16 U.S.C.A § 1415; see also supra notes 272-80 (describing the provisions of the
Act).
282. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b); see supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text (discussing the
sanctions for failure to comply with moratorium commitments).
283. The European Parliament of the European Community (EC) voted on November 22, 1991
in favor of a resolution to ask the EC Commission to ban tuna imports caught by driftnets and
purse seining operations affecting dolphins. See EC Gets Assurances Italy Will Limit Imports of
Tuna Caught by Purse Seines, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Jan. 21, 1992). Also, Mexico asserts that
it will commit itself to harvesting "dolphin-free" tuna. Salinas Discusses Trade, Immigration,
Environment, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at 3; Mexico Reaffirms 'Ensenada Commitment' to
Dolphin Safety, PR Newswire, Nov. 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNews File.
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tually lead to the decrease in dolphin mortality that the MMPA
anticipated. The United States should capitalize on the opportunity
to insist that environmental issues be addressed in the international
trade arena, and in particular, in GATT.
CONCLUSION
The GATT panel decision condemning the U.S. embargo of yel-
lowfin tuna provides the United States with the opportunity to assert
a leadership role in devising a method by which countries can imple-
ment strong environmental policies without risking economic dam-
age. The United States should demand that the international com-
munity recognize that neither serious environmental problems nor
their solutions respect territorial boundaries and, furthermore, that
the resolution to the world's environmental problems is necessarily*
linked to international trade. This being the case, the international
trade arena is an appropriate place to address and attempt to re-
solve international environmental concerns.
Maureen Dolan-Pearson
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